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Abstract
In 2015, hundreds of new civil initiatives emerged to provide stopgap help to refugees arriving in Belgium. This article
zooms out from this moment of solidarity and explores the broader socio-political conditions that allowed these initiatives
to emerge and, in some cases, solidify into professional service-providers or powerful political actors. The article focuses
on two case studies, one in Flanders and one in Brussels. In Flanders, the Hospitable Network brings together local civil ini-
tiatives which have drawn upon the networks and skills of senior citizens with considerable experience in civic associations,
NGOs and social movements. While these initiatives have partly filled the gaps that were created by a series of neoliberal
reforms in Flanders’ citizenship regime, the same neoliberal outlook has prevented these initiatives from being institution-
alised. In Brussels, the Citizen Platform for the Support of Refugees has mobilised largely among the city’s super-diverse
population. The Platform’s development has been shaped by Brussels’ continuing attractiveness to immigrants, as well as
by the city’s complex governance structure, which has provided it with both material support and increasing opposition.
As a result, the Platform has become a highly visible political actor offering partly professionalised support to refugees.
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1. Introduction
Since the summer of 2015, citizens have established var-
ious initiatives to provide stopgap help to refugees ar-
riving in Europe. While most research has focused on
citizens’ actions and discourses (Ataç, Rygiel, & Stierl,
2016; della Porta, 2018; Feischmidt & Zakaria, 2019;
Youkhana & Sutter, 2017), this article zooms out from
these moments of solidarity, and explores the broader
socio-political conditions that allowed these initiatives
to emerge and, in some cases, solidify into professional
service-providers or powerful political actors. I focus on
two civil initiatives in particular: the Hospitable Network
in Flanders and the Citizen Platform for the Support of
Refugees in Brussels. In both cases I describe how the so-
cial backgrounds of its leading volunteers and the politi-
cal environment in which they emerged, have impacted
the way in which these initiatives have organised them-
selves,which strategies they use, and towhat extent they
have become institutionalised. More concretely, I argue
that the Hospitable Network emerged in the context of
neoliberal policy reforms, which provided an incentive
for citizens tomobilise and oppose its institutionalisation.
The Citizen Platform, however, exemplifies how super-
diverse metropolises such as Brussels can be a place
where new (fleeting) forms of solidarity can be crafted.
I substantiate these arguments by drawing on two
types of data. First, I draw on desk-based research that
includes an analysis of the secondary literature on Bel-
gian citizenship regimes prior to 2015, and a supplemen-
tary, primary analysis of recent policy documents and
press statements by the actors involved. In these analy-
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ses, I focus on the relations between state and civil ac-
tors. Second, I analytically describe two case studies for
which I draw on on-going ethnographic work, compris-
ing both in-depth interviews and participant observation.
In Flanders, I have worked with the Hospitable Network
(“Gastvrij Netwerk”), a platform of 38 civil initiatives op-
erating in local municipalities. The Hospitable Network
organises boardmeetings, workshops and newsletters in
which member initiatives exchange experiences and de-
velop common strategies to support refugees. The sup-
port they provide responds to refugees’ changing needs:
finding housing, practising Dutch, children’s homework,
everyday administration, leisure and developing social
contacts with established locals. In Brussels, I worked
with the Citizen Platform for the Support of Refugees,
which emerged in 2015 from the tens of thousands of
citizens who offered stopgap help to refugees stranded
in the capital. Over time, the Platform has developed
into a volunteer-driven NGO that offers an array of ser-
vices to forced migrants, irrespective of their legal sta-
tus. These include both general social services (e.g., lan-
guage classes, socio-administrative advice) and humani-
tarian assistance (e.g., shelter, food, clothing).
My on-going ethnographic work with both initiatives
has taken a variety of forms. In the Hospitable Network
I have participated in general assemblies, national work-
shops and the activities of some of its local member
groups. I have also conducted seven in-depth interviews
with the Network’s leading volunteers, focussing on its
rise, organisational development and its relations with
state actors. In the following months I will conduct in-
terviews with individual volunteers from the Network’s
member organisations. In the Citizen Platform, I have
participated as a volunteer in its various social and hu-
manitarian services, and in a wider range of actions such
as demonstrations, workshops and social events. While
I am still conducting interviews at the time of writing,
I have to date conducted 14 interviews with its coordi-
nators (5) and individual volunteers (nine).
In the next section, I first develop a conceptual frame-
work, to explore the conditions that allowed these ini-
tiatives to emerge and have shaped their development
over time.
2. Social Networks, Political Opportunities
Both the Hospitable Network and the Citizen Platform
strive towards a dual goal: to provide basic humanitarian
and social services to a diverse group of forced migrants;
and to induce broader cultural and political changes to
improve forced migrants’ living conditions. Only the lat-
ter makes them a social movement in the strict sense
(cf. Jasper, 2014). Although I therefore think we should
explore, rather than assume that these civil initiatives
represent a nascent social movement (Vandevoordt, in
press-b; cf. Melucci, 1989), this article makes use of key
concepts in social movement studies. I do so for two rea-
sons. First, a large part of the recent scholarly work on
civil initiatives supporting refugees has been firmly situ-
ated within this literature (e.g., Ataç et al., 2016; della
Porta, 2018; Pries, 2018). To link this article to these de-
bates, it makes sense to use a similar conceptual frame-
work. Second and more importantly, social movement
studies provide us with concepts that are useful to analy-
se how these initiatives develop over time. I draw on two
concepts in particular: the social networks and skills of
the movements’ (leading) participants, and the political
opportunity structures (POS) in which they emerge. Fo-
cusing on these two notions will help us understand how
these civil initiatives have organised themselves, which
strategies they use to achieve their goals, and the extent
to which they are able to become institutionalised as so-
cial and/or political actors.
First, from earlier studies we know that newly emerg-
ingmovementsmobilise participants through existing so-
cial networks (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Snow, Zurcher,
& Ekland-Olson, 1980). This was the case for many Eu-
ropean civil initiatives supporting refugees in 2015. In
Germany, for instance, scholars have documented that
34%of the volunteers providing stopgap help to refugees
in 2015 had been involved in volunteering work with
refugees prior to 2015 (Karakayali & Kleist, 2016). Simi-
larly, Pries (2018) has argued with respect to Germany
and Spain that the civil initiatives supporting refugees
during and after 2015 have built strongly upon an exist-
ing body of NGOs and civic associations.
What interests me in this article, however, is how in-
dividuals’ embeddedness in social networks shapes the
way in which these civil initiatives work. To refine this
question I draw on Jasper’s (1997, 2014) biographical ap-
proach, which focuses on the skills participants have ac-
quired in previous social contexts.1 According to Jasper
(2014), for instance, the rise of the women’s movement
in the US was partly driven by women who had partici-
pated in the student and peace movements a few years
before. There they had learned how to embed their lo-
cal organisations into national networks, how to organ-
ise symbolic protests and how to translate everyday ex-
periences into policy demands. In a similar vein, draw-
ing attention to individuals’ previous social networks can
help us understand three things about recently emerging
civil initiatives supporting refugees: how do they organ-
ise themselves? Which strategies do they deploy? And
which approach do they develop in supporting refugees?
Second, scholars have increasingly focused on move-
ments’ POS: the external political environment in which
they arise, develop and have institutionalised them-
selves (e.g., Tarrow, 2011). Two factors are of particular
1 Within the sub-strand of “resource mobilization theory”, individual skills have also been understood in terms of “human and cultural resources”
(Edwards,McCarthy, &Mataic, 2018). In this article, however, I draw upon Jasper’s (1997, 2014) conceptualisation, largely because his meaning-centred
cultural-sociological approach fits better with the overall scope of my ethnographic work than the rationalist assumptions underlying the “resource
mobilisation” paradigm. Admittedly, for this article both approaches would have been suitable.
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importance to our purpose: the relation between state
and civil actors, and the needs that are created by spe-
cific policies. To begin with the former, it is crucial to
note that Belgium has a long tradition of corporatist-
democratic decision-making, in which civic associations
are closely involved in the organisation of the welfare
state, both as service-providers and as partners in polit-
ical decision-making. In this sense, municipal, regional
and federal governments may offer resources for civil
initiatives to professionalise their services and institu-
tionalise their position as a formal organisation. How-
ever, various Belgian state actors have recently moved
away from this corporatist model towards a model of ne-
oliberal governance, thereby limiting civil actors’ role in
decision-making (Van Puymbroeck & Saeys, 2014). How
has this context, then, influenced the development and
institutionalisation of these civil initiatives?
A second factor of POS concerns the needs that have
been (in)directly created by specific policies. One of the
more pertinent critiques that has emerged with respect
to civil initiatives supporting refugees, is that they fill the
gaps that were created by their national governments
(Vandyk&Misbach, 2016). This brings us to the following
question: in which ways were the needs citizens sought
to address a consequence of broader developments in
Belgium’s asylum and integration policies?
3. A Brief History of Belgian Integration Policies
In this section I sketch some of the broader develop-
ments in recent Belgian integration policies. I concen-
trate on the POS these policies created, in the twofold
sense of the relation between state and civic actors,
and in creating immigrants’ needs that were later ad-
dressed by civil actors. First, however, it is useful to note
that Belgium has an exceptionally complex constellation
of migration and integration policies (Martiniello, 2013).
While the Federal government is responsible for most
matters relating to migration, such as nationality pro-
cedures, deportation and asylum, the Regional govern-
ments of Flanders andWallonia are responsible for the in-
tegration of immigrants, which includes organising civic
integration and language courses, and ensuring access
to education, work, housing and health care. To make
the situation even more complex, Belgian municipalities
have a relatively high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis their
Regional and Federal counterparts in deciding whether
and how they take initiatives in ensuringmigrants’ access
to housing, work and education.
Like many Western European countries, Belgium’s
recent immigration history began with the arrival of
Mediterranean “guest workers”, which reached its zenith
in the 1950s and 1960s. As consecutive governments ex-
pected these “guest workers” to return to their countries
of origin, most of the social support came from citizens.
The latter organised language classes, helped to find ac-
commodation, set up leisure associations, and helped to
establish the first mosques (Goeman & Van Puymbroeck,
2011; Groffy & Debruyne, 2014). For a long time, the re-
ception ofmigrants in Belgiumwas thus characterised by
a lack of coherent political vision on integration, asylum
and migration. This created opportunities for citizens to
take action and organise things themselves.
In the 1980s several Belgian governments began to
develop integration policies. In this period the Belgian
state underwent a process of devolution, in which policy
domains that were previously a competence of the Fed-
eral state, such as integration, were transferred to the
Regional governments of Flanders and Wallonia (Adam,
2013). In Flanders, these developments began after the
electoral breakthrough of the extreme-right Vlaams Blok
in 1988. In response to this perceived integration cri-
sis, the Flemish government created long-term project
funds for civil initiatives and municipal governments de-
velop local integration policies. In line with Belgium’s
general political tradition of corporatist-democratic co-
operation, civil and state actors collaborated closely with
one another as more or less equal partners. Civil ac-
tors were granted considerable autonomy in setting pri-
orities, building a vision and establishing an organisa-
tional structure. Throughout the 1990s, their services
gradually became more professional and specialised. In
Flanders, for instance, 43 local and eight regional integra-
tion centres were established, as well as four Dutch lan-
guage houses and four Social translation centres (Groffy
& Debruyne, 2014). The dominant vision that emerged
in Flanders2 somewhat resembled the multicultural poli-
cies that had long been central to integration policies in
the Netherlands, in which social support was organised
along the lines of differentmigrant groups, depending on
their nationality, religion and gender.
In Brussels, a different, more complex situation has
emerged. This has partly been the result of a policy gap,
as the Brussels Region does not have jurisdiction over
integration. Instead, migrants in Brussels can choose to
comply either with Flemish or Walloon integration poli-
cies, both of which are ill-adapted to the super-diverse
context of Brussels, which is similar to other metropoli-
tan capitals such as Paris and London (Bousetta, Favell,
& Martiniello, 2018). As a result, the pressure to deal
with the capital’s super-diversity has been largely left to
Brussels’ 19 municipalities and its large battery of civic
associations. Some of these municipalities have further-
more seen a rapid diversification since the 1980s, cre-
ating minority-majorities (i.e., where the majority of in-
habitants have a migration background). Especially in
poorer and super-diverse municipalities such as Sint-
Jans-Molenbeek and Anderlecht, this has contributed to
2 The main difference between Flemish and Dutch multiculturalism was that in Flanders these policies emerged from bottom-up civil initiatives, which
were subsequently incorporated into government policies, whereas those in the Netherlands were largely installed top-down by the central, national
government (Adam, 2013). In Wallonia, a non-interventionist policy developed which rather resembled the French, Republican model: the integration
of newly arriving migrants was not seen as requiring a separate competence, but as an aspect of mainstream institutions and policies such as education,
work, and welfare.
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a relative dominance of left-leaning, inclusive social poli-
cies that have been more favourable to a “soft” stance
on integration (Bousetta et al., 2018). In these munici-
palities, the persistence of strong connections between
socialist civic associations and the still-dominant Parti
Socialiste have fed into an exceptionally high concentra-
tion of professional and non-professional civic associa-
tions, even by Belgian standards (Swerts & Oosterlynck,
2018). In addition, despite its lack of formal powers to
deal with integration, the Brussels Region has supported
civil actors such as Samu Social, Vluchtelingenwerk and
Ciré, which are either directly or indirectly active in the
field of integration. In sum, Brussels has been charac-
terised by a complex multilevel governance structure,
that both created a gap in coherent integration policies
and a range of opportunities for civil initiatives to secure
funding and operational autonomy.
In Flanders, however, the continuing growth of the
extreme right fed into criticism of Flanders’ fragmented
multiculturalist policies. According to critics, the field
of integration was characterised by an unmanageable
proliferation of civil and state actors offering overlap-
ping services and embodying contradictory visions on
integration (Groffy & Debruyne, 2014). Fuelled by Eu-
ropean critiques on the failure of multicultural policies,
the Flemish government adopted a series of measures
that gradually replaced its ‘cooperative multicultural-
ism’ with a neo-liberal, neo-communitarian citizenship
regime that shifted power from civil actors to the state
(Van Puymbroeck & Saeys, 2014). This development cul-
minated in a controversial reform of the integration sec-
tor in 2014, which centralised a wide range of social ser-
vices into a single agency that would develop a more co-
herent vision. The local and provincial centres for integra-
tion, social translation and legal advice that had emerged
from civil initiatives, were thus merged into a single
government-controlled Agency of Integration and Citi-
zenship (‘Agentschap Inburgering en Integratie’; Groffy
& Debruyne, 2014; Van Puymbroeck & Saeys, 2014).
On a national level, the establishment of the Flem-
ish Agency of Integration and Citizenship was the result
of a dual process of Flemish state-building (Adam, 2013)
and nation-building (Martiniello, 2013). As the Belgian
state increasingly shifted competences towards the Flem-
ish region, the Agency of Integration and Citizenship took
on a task that seemed particularly crucial to nurturing
Flanders’ supposedly homogenous culture. The major
developments in Flemish integration should therefore be
seen against the backdrop of a programme of regional
state and nation-building.
From a broader perspective, these reforms were
driven by the rising popularity of neoliberal discourses
across the European continent. These elements are of
crucial importance here. On the one hand, neoliberal
state actors both withdraw from, and expand their grip
on society: state actors reduce support to civil actors
and demand more control over the work of those ac-
tors it continues to support. As a result, civil actors are
seen as contracted service providers, rather than po-
litical partners with considerable autonomy. Moreover,
these neoliberal discourses have tried to make migrants
responsible by rendering their social rights conditional
upon their achievements (Joppke, 2007; Schinkel & Van
Houdt, 2010). Until 2013, the Flemish state mostly con-
ceived of integration as a two-way process requiring
bothmigrants and the established communities to shoul-
der their responsibilities. From 2014 onwards, the em-
phasis shifted towards “civic integration” or “citizenisa-
tion” (Inburgering), in which it was primarilymigrants’ re-
sponsibility to prove their cultural assimilation and eco-
nomic self-reliance (Groffy & Debruyne, 2014). In order
to retain certain social (e.g., social housing, social bene-
fits) and civic rights (e.g., family reunification, naturalisa-
tion), immigrants were now obliged to prove their profi-
ciency in Dutch and their prior independence from ben-
efits. Despite the specifically national context of Flemish
state and nation-building, these developments can thus
be situated in a broader converging trend in European
integration policies (cf. Joppke, 2007; Schinkel & Van
Houdt, 2010).
Summing up, Belgiumhas long been characterised by
a lack of coherent integration policies. Since the 1980s,
different integration policies have developed in Flanders
and Wallonia, which created a policy gap in the Region
of Brussels. In Flanders, the initial model of ‘coopera-
tive multiculturalism’ was gradually replaced by neolib-
eral policies that reduced the social and political role of
civil actors, and gradually eroded migrants’ social rights.
In Brussels, the pertinent policy-gap and the growing
super-diversity of its population have fed into strong col-
laborations between state and civil actors, with the lat-
ter playing a crucial role in the support of newly arriving
migrants. In the following sections I describe how these
broader contexts have shaped the responses of civil ac-
tors to the 2015 “asylum crisis” and its aftermath.
4. The 2015 Reception Crisis and Its Aftermath
In Belgium, the increased arrival of refugees in 2015
manifested itself most clearly in the emergence of a
spontaneous camp in the Maximilian Park, where citi-
zens provided all kinds of humanitarian, social and po-
litical support (Depraetere & Oosterlynck, 2017; Lafaut
& Coene, 2018; Vandevoordt & Verschraegen, 2019).
In this article, however, I will not focus on this initial
moment of mobilisation, but on the long-term mobili-
sation of the Hospitable Network and the Citizen Plat-
form. The acute crisis of 2015 developed into two dis-
tinct crises in Flanders and Brussels, both of which have
shaped how these initiatives have organised themselves.
In Flanders, a slower integration crisis emerged, which
centred around affordable housing. In Brussels, the Citi-
zen Platform was confronted with a more volatile situa-
tion, as migrants of different legal statuses continued to
arrive in and around the Maximilian Park.
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4.1. A Slow Burn: Flanders’ Integration Crisis
In this section I describe three factors that have shaped
the rise and development of the Hospitable Network:
the immediate needs created by the 2015 asylum crisis
and its aftermath; the social backgrounds of its leading
volunteers; and the long-term POS in which it operates.
Together, these factors reveal a complex image of the
Network, caught by two paradoxes. While the Network
was able to emerge due to neoliberal policies that cre-
ated the need to take action, the same neoliberal poli-
cies have made it difficult to institutionalise their efforts.
Similarly, while the Network’s leading volunteers were
equipped with the skills to address the structural causes
of refugees’ problems and engage in political dialogue,
the rather hostile political environment of the Flemish
government put them in a position where they were in-
advertently filling the gaps created by Flanders’ neolib-
eral integration policies.
To understand how and why civil initiatives in
Flanders emerged, it is crucial to take into account how
asylum seekers are accommodated in Belgium. Since the
early 1990s, the Federal government has gradually de-
veloped a twofold accommodation system coordinated
by Fedasil, a government agency established for this
very purpose. First, Fedasil coordinates a network of
collective reception centres, some of which are man-
aged by Fedasil, and some of which are managed by
the Red Cross. Second, Fedasil coordinates a network of
Local Accommodation Initiatives (LAIs), which are usu-
ally managed by municipalities’ social services. When
the number of asylum seekers rapidly rose in the sum-
mer of 2015, the Federal government established emer-
gency reception centres in places such as abandonedmil-
itary barracks, bungalow parks and pontoons, thereby
creating an additional 15,000 places (Fedasil, 2016). As
early as 1 September 2015, the Federal government
urged municipalities to create more LAIs: an additional
1,010 LAIs therefore became operational by the end of
2015, and 2,151 more by the end of 2016 (Fedasil, 2015,
2016, 2017).
These LAIs, and, to some extent, the emergency re-
ception centres, proved of crucial importance to the mo-
bilisation of citizens across Flanders. These additional
places for accommodation brought asylum seekers into
smaller municipalities, which provided citizens with an
opportunity to mobilise themselves locally. This policy
measure also had a decisive impact upon the type of sup-
port these initiatives provided. Their work concentrated
largely on the local integration of refugees as they passed
through the asylum system: first as asylum seekers resid-
ing in LAIs, and second as either refugees who had re-
ceiving protected status, or as undocumented migrants
whose asylum applications had been rejected. Hence,
they helped refugees to find housing, practice their
Dutch, support school-going children, organise women’s
groups, introduced them to leisure associations and or-
ganised socio-cultural events to strengthen their net-
works. In other words, these emergency reception mea-
sures created a favourable political opportunity struc-
ture for citizens to become involved, because it provided
them with both a point of contact with local state actors
(the municipal social centres organising the LAIs) and
with a situation in which their help was needed (i.e., ev-
eryday social support for asylum seekers).
Second, the Hospitality Network has been strongly
shaped by the networks and skills of its leading protag-
onists. Most of its leading figures are senior men and
women who had recently retired, and who had spent
a large part of their lives in a variety of civil organi-
sations and networks. A small but significant number
had been active in NGOs supporting migrants since the
1980s, either professionally or voluntarily. Others had
been members of local branches of the North-South
movement, a so-called “new social movement” which
arose in the late 1960s and was institutionalised in the
1980s and 1990s (Walgrave, 1994). Yet others had been
active in one of the many associations related to the
“pillars” of Belgian civil society, including socialist and
Catholic labour unions, and socio-cultural, women’s and
youth associations.
Citizens’ firm roots in organised civil society had a
decisive impact on their approach. Most importantly,
they tried to avoid merely offering ad hoc assistance
to refugees, preferring to work structurally instead. This
had been a defining feature of the three types of civil or-
ganisations they had previously participated in. Since its
radicalisation in the late 1960s, the North-South move-
ment had strongly set itself apart from charitable forms
of development aid. Instead, their fundraising actions,
awareness-raising campaigns and political interventions
were rooted in a critical political economic perspec-
tive on Northern countries’ responsibilities in producing
Southern poverty (Walgrave, 1994). Similarly, the civil ini-
tiatives that emerged to support the “guest workers” in
the 1960 and 1970s and the first groups of refugees in
the 1980s, had developed an increasingly structural ap-
proach due to their professionalisation in the 1990s. In
this period, they moved away from a perspective cen-
tred on individual well-being, towards one focused on
broader issues such as access to work, housing and ed-
ucation (Groffy & Debruyne, 2014). And lastly, the civic
associations in which many of the Network’s leaders had
participated, were also characterised by a long-term em-
beddednesswithin the broader environment of Flanders’
socialist and Catholic pillars (cf. Walgrave, 1994).
The Hospitable Network operated in much the same
way. Most of its member initiatives did not emerge from
the spatial setting of a pending humanitarian crisis, but
from a call among active locals to attend a board meet-
ing, to explore what they could do for refugees, how
they could best achieve this, and with which other ac-
tors they could cooperate. In linewith Belgium’s tradition
of corporatist-democratic cooperation, most initiatives
thus immediately tried to establish contactwith localmu-
nicipalities and their social services, as well as with local
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NGOs focusing on poverty and other forms of exclusion.
In many instances, this resulted in the launch of (new)
working groups on refugee support, in which both the
emerging civil initiative, themunicipality’s social workers
and other NGOs participated. In addition, most of these
initiatives not only provided support to refugees, but also
tried to influence local policy-makers by writing mem-
oranda and organising meetings to address barriers to
refugee inclusion. Most initiatives also tried to reach out
to local citizens by raising awareness of refugees’ stories,
and by organising socio-cultural events to establish per-
sonal encounters. In this sense, the social networks of its
leading volunteers and the skills and visions they had de-
veloped there have had a crucial impact on how theymo-
bilised, how they engaged with state actors, and on their
structural approach to addressing refugees’ problems.
So what were the more structural problems these
civil initiatives encountered? First and foremost, in
Flanders, the 2015 reception crisis slowly fed into a
more long-term housing crisis. In contrast to countries
such as the Netherlands and Germany, asylum seekers
in Belgium are only offered accommodation during their
asylum procedure. There are no state agencies respon-
sible for coordinating refugees’ transition into the reg-
ular housing market. As soon as they have received a
positive decision on their application, refugees need to
find accommodation by themselves within two, or amax-
imum of four months. Most struggle to do so, for several
reasons: they have limited social networks, do not know
the language or the local housing market and its admin-
istrative procedures, they have no steady income and
are often faced with racial and religious discrimination.
In addition, the Belgian housing market is characterised
by a high degree of property ownership and a shortage
of cheap rental accommodation (Saeys, Vandevoordt, &
Verschraegen, 2018).
From the moment refugees receive protected sta-
tus, they are entitled to municipal social services, which
includes a living allowance. In principle, however, they
need to be residents of a specific municipality before
they can apply for the material or social support it pro-
vides. This means that it is up to the municipality’s social
services to decide whether or not they will assist newly
arriving refugees. And as some municipalities have at-
tempted to discourage migrants from settling on their
territories, most refugees became dependent upon their
own social networks, civil initiatives and NGOs to find
housing (Saeys et al., 2018).
While the root causes of Belgium’s housing crisis are
endemic to both its housing market and the organisa-
tion of refugees’ accommodation, they can also be seen
in relation to the neoliberal reforms in recent years. Be-
fore the 2014 reform, for instance, around 50 centres
for integration were embedded in Flanders’ municipal-
ities and provinces, from where they addressed immi-
grants’ structural barriers to inclusion. The reform, how-
ever, had shifted its attention away from these structural
barriers, had dismantled the local connections of these
integration centres and concentrated more on migrants’
own responsibilities. When these civil initiatives set out
to focus on refugees’ structural exclusion on a local level,
it looked very much as if they were filling a gap that had
been created by the 2014 reform. In this sense, the re-
form created POS that were favourable to civil mobilisa-
tion, as it indirectly created a gap in social support which
seemed necessary for refugees’ inclusion in central so-
cial institutions.
Apart from ensuring refugees’ access to the hous-
ing market, these initiatives tried to connect refugees
to Belgian society in the broader sense. They concen-
trated on the everyday needs of refugees, for which pro-
fessional social workers lacked time to provide support:
they accompanied them on trips to lawyers to trans-
late between legal jargon and refugees’ complex stories;
helped them find their way in Belgian bureaucracy; of-
fered homework support to children; organised events
where women, men and young people could diversify
and strengthen their social networks; used their own net-
works to find opportunities for work and helped them
to apply for jobs; personally introduced refugees into
civic associations to develop their interests (e.g., music
school, sports club, etc.); and organised socio-cultural ac-
tivities to help them meet up with locals. All of these ac-
tivities had been the core business of the civil initiatives
that arose prior to the 1990s and then were institution-
alised into a wide range of local integration centres.
The same neoliberal discourse that produced the
need (or opportunity) for these initiatives to arise,
however, also prevented their institutionalisation. Be-
tween 2016 and 2018, Flemish Minister of Home Affairs
Liesbeth Homans created a fund of 20 million euros for
the local integration of refugees (Deprez, Platteau, &
Hondeghem, 2018). By allocating these funds to munic-
ipalities instead of to the civil initiatives—which had, in
many instances, not only taken the lead in refugee sup-
port, but also had better connections and expertise to
do so, given that most rural municipalities had little if
any experience in working with immigrants—Homans
continued the long-term trend of shifting power from
civil actors to the state. In contrast to the civil initia-
tives that arose in the 1970s and 1980s, this generation
of initiatives had fewer opportunities to professionalise
their work. To put it differently, the neo-liberal outlook
of the Flemish government—which saw civil actors as
potential service-providers that could be contracted by
state actors, rather than equal social partners—thus pro-
duced a political opportunity structure that encouraged
the emergence of civil initiatives but was hostile towards
their institutionalisation.
In addition, the Federal government’s restrictive
stance towards immigration also had a negative impact
on citizens’ opportunities to mobilise. In the summer
of 2018, State Secretary of Asylum and Migration Theo
Francken announced a substantial reduction of the re-
ception capacity for asylum seekers, which tilted the bal-
ance of the reception network back to collective recep-
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tion centres, instead of LAIs. Nine temporary reception
centres were closed down (i.e., 2,854 places), while the
number of places in LAIs were reduced by 3,600 (Fedasil,
2018). This decision was informed by Francken’s earlier
attempt to establish a two-tiered asylum system: a fast-
track to local integration for refugees who were either
vulnerable or were very likely to be granted asylum, and
who would be accommodated in LAIs (e.g., Syrians), and
a slow-track for others, who would be accommodated
in collective reception centres. Several of the Hospitable
Network initiatives protested against these decisions. Ac-
cording to them, the expertise and networks they had
established in close collaboration with municipal social
services and local schools, hospitals and leisure clubs
would be lost if these LAIs were closed. Put differently,
this shift from individual to collective accommodation is
likely to have a negative impact on citizens’ mobilisation
for refugees, as the LAIs, specifically, had provided them
with an opportunity to set up local initiatives to become
involved in the first place.
To sum up, the neoliberal policy shift of the Flemish
government created opportunities for civil initiatives to
mobilise but made it difficult for them to institutionalise
their work. And while the Hospitable Network’s leading
volunteers tried to take structural action and engage in
political dialogue, they did so in a political climate that
seemed rather hostile towards cooperation.
4.2. A Blazing Fire: Brussels’ Recurring Humanitarian
Crisis
The Citizen Platform was one of the first initiatives to
arise from the spontaneous refugee camp in the Max-
imilian Park, in an attempt to coordinate citizens’ ac-
tions. Initially, citizens provided mainly humanitarian
support (shelter, food, clothes, washing facilities), yet
as Brussels continued to attract refugees before, during
and after their asylum procedure, the Platform gradu-
ally expanded its range of services. In this section I de-
scribe three factors that have shaped the development
of the Platform: Brussels’ continuing importance to im-
migrants; the city’s super-diverse pool of volunteers; and
its complex multilevel governance structure. Together,
these factors have turned the Platform into a highly vis-
ible political actor, offering partly professionalised sup-
port to forced migrants.
First, Brussels has repeatedly been the primary site in
which Belgium’s reception crises have manifested them-
selves. As I noted in Section 4, in 2015 the Federal gov-
ernment’s failure to organise accommodation for asylum
seekers created an opportunity for citizens to mobilise in
and around Brussels. In the summer of 2017, a new de-
velopment led the Citizen Platform to expand its range
of activities, enlarge its pool of volunteers, and develop
a more radical political voice. An increasing number of
migrants arrived in Brussels, most of whom could not or
preferred not to apply for asylum in Belgium. Some had
had their fingerprints taken in other European countries
such as Italy, Greece or Hungary, where they either did
not want to apply for asylum, or where they had applied
for asylum and were appalled by refugees’ living condi-
tions in those countries (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2019;
Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen, 2019). Others were de-
termined to reach the U.K. and had been forced to
flee the dismantled camps of Calais, Dunkirk and Paris.
In Belgium, as in France, these migrants were increas-
ingly targeted by police actions to arrest and deport
them (Médecins du Monde, 2018). And because they
preferred not to apply for asylum, they were excluded
from most institutional support provided by municipal
services and established NGOs.
As the Platform’s volunteers saw that there were
many minors, women and persons with urgent medical
needs among them, they responded by setting up two
lines of action, both ofwhich drewheavily upon their ear-
lier experiences in 2015. First, the Platform reinforced its
partnerships with Médecins du Monde, Médecins Sans
Frontières, the Red Cross and Oxfam International. In
close collaboration, they established a humanitarian hub
in the vicinity of theMaximilian Park, where they offered
phone services, food, clothes and medical and mental
health care (Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen, 2019). Sec-
ond, the Citizen Platform developed a twofold system of
shelter, offeringmigrants a bed for the night. In response
to an emergency call by the Platform’s coordinators in
August 2017, individual volunteers took the most vulner-
able migrants into their homes. While this was intended
as a one-time emergency measure, a series of controver-
sies emerging around State Secretary Francken contin-
ued to “shock” new citizens into joining the Platform’s
group of volunteering hosts (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995).
The Platform’s coordinators estimate that around 8,000
volunteers hosted migrants in their homes at least once
between August 2017 and March 2019. As a result, be-
tween 20 and 600 migrants have been hosted in volun-
teers’ homes for nearly every single night (Vandevoordt,
in press-a). In this sense, the Citizen Platform emerged in
response to urgent needs for shelter and humanitarian
support that were created partly by Federal policy devel-
opments: the failure of this policy to provide adequate
accommodation for asylum seekers in 2015, and the de-
cision to persecute and exclude a group of migrants who
could not or preferred not to apply for asylum in Belgium.
A second factor shaping the Citizen Platform is the
pool of potential volunteers it draws upon. In contrast
to the ‘Hospitable Network’, the Platform is driven by an
ethnically and demographically diverse group of mem-
bers, including migrants of different generations and
backgrounds, (international) students, as well as profes-
sional expats and their children. This diversity has helped
to create a cosmopolitan vibe that attracts a variety of
people with a shared interest in this type of environment.
At the same time, the Platform has faced a high turnover
of volunteers and coordinators. This is partly because
much of the work they do is emotionally taxing, and be-
cause of a widespread sense that they are continuously
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operating in a crisis mode of urgent humanitarian sup-
port, since otherwise migrants sleep out on the street
without any adequate legal information, medical care,
food or clean clothes. Continued absence of government
action and difficulty for professional NGOs to take action
creates a large burden on the Platform’s volunteers, es-
pecially its more committed, driven volunteers. In addi-
tion, many of its volunteers are young people, students
and expats who do not have a long-term connection to
Brussels. As a result, many volunteers engage in a form
of volunteering that is associated with liquid modernity:
it is flexible and tailored to their schedule and renewed
(social) experiences take priority over long-term engage-
ment focussing on structural solutions—as is the case
in the Hospitable Network. After a brief but intense pe-
riod of volunteering at the Platform, students and expats,
for instance, frequently return to their home countries,
move elsewhere, or find a job. Every time I visited one of
the Platform’s social services to help as a volunteer, I en-
countered “newer” rather than “established” volunteers.
This fluid, continuously renewed pool of volunteers
has contributed to the Platform’s fluid organisational
structure. Two aspects are particularly important here.
On the one hand, practical organisation of the Platform
takes place via Facebook, rather than through more for-
malised meetings, as was the case in the Hospitable
Network (Vandevoordt, in press-a). Available volunteers
are matched to specific services through polls on closed
Facebook groups. This allows the Platform to attract vol-
unteers who are currently available, and it allows vol-
unteers to take up shifts that fit their agenda, regard-
less of their plans in the longer term. On the other
hand, this Facebook-based set-up means that the Plat-
form can call on its members to take immediate action.
When new crisis situations emerge, the Platform is of-
ten able to act more quickly than government agencies,
professional NGOs and other civil initiatives. When the
Platform’s core volunteers saw an increasing number of
youths and women roaming around theMaximilian Park,
for instance, they immediately and successfully appealed
to their broader pool of volunteers to provide shelter.
In this sense, Brussels’ super-diverse demographic situ-
ation and the generally cosmopolitan outlook many of
its inhabitants share, seem to provide the Platform with
a large, continuously self-refreshing pool of available vol-
unteers. As a result, the Platform’s modus operandi is to
take action first, and reflect on structural solutions sec-
ond. This contrasts with the Hospitable Network, which
emerged from established social networks and which
centred its approach around identifying structural needs
before taking concrete action.
So far, we have seen how the Citizen Platform has
been shaped by its specific setting in Brussels, which pro-
vided it with both a site of repeated crises andwith a con-
stantly refreshed pool of volunteers. A third factor shap-
ing the Platform is the POS produced by Brussels’ com-
plex multilevel governance structure. As the Platform’s
coordinators did not think their dual shelter system was
sustainable in the long run, they lobbied the Municipal,
Regional and Federal governments to establish an emer-
gency shelter where migrants could receive basic medi-
cal care and legal-administrative information. While the
Platform did not manage to convince these governments
to establish such a centre, they did secure enough sup-
port to open such a centre themselves. The so-called
Porte d’Ulysse opened in December 2017 and gradually
expanded its capacity from 80 to 350 beds. Some of Brus-
sels’ 19municipalities provided cleaning andwashing ser-
vices, while the Brussels Regional government covered
the costs of renting an empty wing of an office build-
ing in Haren, in the outskirts of the city. In May 2018,
the Regional government increased its support, enabling
the Citizen Platform to temporarily employ around 20
full-time staff members, most of whom had been long-
standing volunteers (Vandevoordt, in press-a). This al-
lowed the Platform to gradually make its services more
professional and become less dependent upon individual
volunteers. Summing up, it was the Brussels multilevel
governance structures, and its longer tradition of close
collaboration between state and civil actors, which pro-
vided the Citizen Platform with the political support they
needed to professionalise their services. In this sense,
they found themselves in a local political opportunity
structure that was favourable to their institutionalisation.
In spite of the local support, the Platform also
faced increasing opposition from the Federal govern-
ment, which intensified its attempts to detain and de-
port precisely those undocumented migrants the Plat-
form seeks to support. This has led the Platform to en-
gage inmore assertive political action,mainly in the form
of demonstrations, press statements and symbolic ac-
tions. Two measures in particular have encouraged this
polarisation. First, on 30 June 2017, Federal Minister
of Home Affairs Jan Jambon submitted a draft law that
would make it possible for police forces to enter private
properties if there are suspicions that undocumented
migrants are residing there. In January 2018, however,
this draft law became the subject of an intense public
debate. Judges and legal scholars expressed their con-
cerns that the law did not provide enough checks and
balances to guarantee migrants’ rights. Among both the
government’s liberal parties, resistance arose to the fact
that properties belonging to third parties—i.e., persons
with whom undocumented migrants were staying, in-
cluding Platform volunteers—would also be subject to
such house search warrants. In response, the Citizen
Platform aligned with allied NGOs to organise demon-
strations, press statements and a nation-wide campaign
writing letters to local mayors, asking them to declare
that they would not implement this law if it were to
be adopted at Federal level. Ultimately, the law was
abandoned due to both internal divisions in the Federal
government’s liberal and conservative coalition partners,
and to broader public criticism.
Second, in January 2018, the Federal government
stepped up its actions to arrest both undocumented mi-
Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 106–117 113
grants and human traffickers. In June 2018, the Federal
public ministry charged eleven persons with human traf-
ficking, including four who had hosted undocumented
migrants. This lawsuit attracted considerable media at-
tention and was interpreted as an attempt to under-
mine the image of the Citizen Platform as moral heroes
(cf. Jasper, 2014). Through the lawsuit and the contin-
uous discourse of leading political figures such as Theo
Francken, Jan Jambon and Bart De Wever, the Citizen
Platform was portrayed as an “extreme-left” movement
flirting with the boundaries of the law—even though
its hosting volunteers in particular tend to refer to care,
humanitarianism and solidarity to distance themselves
from politics as a whole (Alcalde & Portos, 2018). While
the four hosts were ultimately cleared of all charges, the
lawsuit did seeman attempt to undermine the Platform’s
ability to host undocumented migrants, and to equate
it with a radical, extremist movement. As a result, the
Platform increasingly adopted a more assertive political
voice, both in public and among its members. In this
sense, it is uncertain to what degree the Federal govern-
ment will be able to create a hostile environment for the
Citizen Platform, and to what extent the Platformwill fur-
ther radicalise its actions to defend its work.
To sum up, the Citizen Platform has been strongly
shaped by the specific context in Brussels. It has re-
sponded to a series of crises affecting the capital, which
were partly produced by the policy gap in organising
the arrival of new immigrants to Brussels. The city’s
super-diverse, sometimes temporary population has pro-
vided the Platform with a constant source of new vol-
unteers. Both these developments have fed into a fluid,
Facebook-based organisational structure, which has had
a crucial impact on how the Platform has been organised
(Vandevoordt, in press-a). And lastly, Brussels’ complex
governance structure has provided the Platform with
both material support and increasing opposition. As a re-
sult, the Platform has become a highly visible political ac-
tor offering partly professionalised support to refugees.
5. Conclusions
This article has argued that the civil initiatives that arose
in response to Europe’s 2015 asylum crisis need to be
understood in the context of broader political develop-
ments. In Belgium, two different crises arose in Flanders
and in Brussels, which have been met with different
forms of civil solidarity. In Flanders, a slow crisis unfolded,
regarding local integration and housing. Crucial local op-
portunities to mobilise were created by the establish-
ment of LAIs and emergency reception shelters across
the region of Flanders. In response, civil initiatives arose
to provide support to refugees throughout their asylum
procedure. Internally, the Hospitable Network has built
on the remnants of older civic organisations in Flanders’
North-South movement, its faith-based and political pil-
lars, and the NGOs supporting migrants in the 1990s and
early 2000s. In linewith this civic heritage, theHospitable
Network’s member initiatives have tried to work struc-
turally, rather than focusing on ad hoc assistance to indi-
vidual refugees. While some of the challenges refugees
faced were created by structural problems in the Belgian
housing market and the system of accommodation for
asylum seekers, these challenges were also generated—
or exacerbated at the very least—by a series of neolib-
eral reforms in preceding years. As a result, local support
services to immigrants had been both centralised and re-
formed, with a greater emphasis on immigrants’ respon-
sibilities. In that sense, the emergence of local civil ini-
tiatives attempting to include refugees more structurally
seemed to fill a gap created by these neoliberal reforms.
At the same time, however, this neoliberal outlook pre-
vented them to institutionalise their services, as it meant
that neither the Flemish nor the Federal government pro-
vided long-term support to the Hospitable Network and
its member initiatives. As a result, the Flemish civil initia-
tives supporting refugees have remained a set of loosely
connected fragments, each operating as a voluntary as-
sociation in a distinct local environment.
The Citizen Platform, by contrast, found several op-
portunities to mobilise and partly professionalise their
work in the specific urban context of Brussels. The pres-
ence, persecution and institutional exclusion of undoc-
umented migrants created a recurring humanitarian cri-
sis to which the Platform responded. To do so, they ac-
quired structural support from several Brussels Munici-
palities and its Regional government. Lastly, the super-
diverse, metropolitan nature of Brussels provided them
with a continuously renewed pool of volunteers and co-
ordinators coming from a variety of backgrounds. On
the other hand, however, the Platform has faced increas-
ing opposition from the Federal government, which not
only stepped up its efforts to detain and deport undoc-
umented migrants, but also tried to undermine citizens’
attempts to support them, both legally and symbolically,
by portraying the Platform as a radical movement balanc-
ing on the borders of legality.
So what do these two case studies tell us about the
broader developments of civil initiatives for supporting
refugees? On the one hand, these cases show us the
significant impact of local circumstances. For both the
Hospitable Network and the Citizen Platform, the POS
provided by their respective municipal, regional and na-
tional governments have played a crucial role in their
rise, their development, and the degree to which they in-
stitutionalise themselves. Furthermore, the social back-
grounds of their leading volunteers have had a crucial im-
pact on the strategies they use to work with state actors,
the approach they develop in helping refugees, and how
they organise themselves internally.
On the other hand, these case studies also point
to two broader developments in refugee support in
Europe. First, despite the persistence of national dif-
ferences, in recent decades European integration poli-
cies have tended to converge to a neoliberal model. Mi-
grants are being made responsible by rendering their so-
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cial rights conditional upon their achievements (Joppke,
2007; Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010; Van Puymbroeck,
Blondeel, & Vandevoordt, 2014), while state actors leave
less room for (corporatist) cooperation with their civil
counterparts. In regions such as Flanders, this has cre-
ated a political environment that stimulates civil actors
to take action in support of refugees, but which makes
it harder for their work to become institutionalised. In
this sense, erodingmigrants’ rights and fostering civil sol-
idarity appear as two sides of the same coin. Second, in
the last few years a burgeoning literature has emerged
on “sanctuary cities” (Bauder, 2017) and “villes d’accueil”
(Bontemps et al., 2018). Since urban governments are of-
ten confronted with the consequences of exclusionary
national policies, they may tend to adopt more inclusive
policies vis-à-vis migrants. From that perspective, the Cit-
izen Platform can perhaps be understood as a rather
unique illustration of this argument. Due to the high pro-
file of the migrants’ situation, the presence of a larger
pool of potential volunteers, and a local government will-
ing to support them, the Citizen Platform found itself in a
climate that was favourable to the professionalisation of
their services. In that sense ametropolis such as Brussels
seems to act as a fruitful space for crafting solidarity.
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